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OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPMTNT IN INDOUESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES*
Indonesia and the Philippines are countries inviting comparison;
there are enough similarities between them to give some hope of isolating
cause-and-effect relationships among the differences. They are
neighboring archipelagoes, perhaps even once part of the same land
mass0 Both are mountainous island economies. While the Philippines
lie generally northward and eastward of Indonesia, their climates are
mach the same. Both countries have a variety of racial groups and lan-
guages, but in both the Malay stock and linguistic roots predominate.
Overall density of population is much the same; Indonesia has some
82 million people and 576,000 square miles, the Philippines has about
22 million people and 116,000 squares. Thus Indonesia has roughly five
tires the area and four times the population of the Philippines. Both
countries achieved independence after World War II following more than
three centuries of colonial rule. Both were essentially "trading posts"
for the metropoles until the late 19th century, and both began their
life as sovereign nations with a heritage of wartime disruption and
devastation.
Economic Problems and Development Plans
There are also common features in their economic problems and in their
plans for dealing with them. The central problems in both countries
Paper presented to the Association for Asian Studies, Boston,
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2are poverty, dependence on a few exports and consequent pressure on
foreign exchange reserves, and unemployment. Solution of these problems
in both countries is complicated by "technological dualism." Both economies
are divided into two distinct sectors: an industrial-and-plantation
sector that is capital-intensive, fixed-technical-coefficient, tech-
nologically advanced, and highly productive; and a peasant-agriculture-
and-cottage-industry sector which has variable technical coefficients,
is highly labor-intensive, is technologically retarded, and is low in
productivity and income. Investment in the first sector tends to widen
the gap between productivity and incomes in the two sectors, since it
does not add proportionately to employment but permits more rapid pop-
ulation growth, adding to disguised unemployment in the other sector,
There is no incentive for investment in the other sector.1
Both countries completed five year plans in the course of 1956,
covering the years 1957-1961. Both Plans are modest ones; both are
essentially projections of current trends which do not provide a
"big push," whether defined in terms of the ratio of investment to
income or in terms of structural change. Both are optimistic in their
estimate of the incremental capital:output ratio--2:1 in a plan directing
the bulk of investment towards industry, power and irrigation, and transport,
Major Differences
Despite the hazards I shall attempt to divide major differences
between those which are basic causes in terms of economic development,
kf. B. Higgins, "The Dualistic Theory of Underdeveloped Areas,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change, January 1956.
3and those which are effects. On the political side, the first causal
difference is that both Hinduism and Islam preceded European colonization
in Indonesia, while no advanced culture preceded colonization in the
Philippines. The Javanese and Sumatran civilizations of the 16th century
were highly developed in both a cultural and economic (trading) sense.
Vestiges of this civilization remain to this day, and have their effects
on attitudes and actions. Islam has become a powerful political force.
Both Hinduism and Islam constitute sources of resistance to certain kinds
of change in Indonesia. In the Philippines, on the other hand, the
Spanish seem to have encountered a cultural and economic vacuum. There
was little resistance to the spread of Roman Catholism among the people
or to adoption of Spanish culture among the elite. Nor was there much
resistance to the adoption of American ideologies, techniques, and accents
after 1896. I have the feeling, moreover, that neither the Spanish nor
the American culture is so firmly entrenched as to provide firm resistance
to any powerful'new ideology that might appear.
Secondly, there are the various differences between colonization
by Spain and the United States on the one hand and by Holland on the
other0 In particular may be mentioned the Dutch system of "indirect
rule" which prevented the establishment of a strong central government
and the training of a modern civil service. Also important was the tendency
of the Dutch to discourage indigenous entrepreneurship while leaving
the religion and the culture largely untouched. In the Philippines,
1 See for example Clifford Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic
Behavior in a Central Javanese Town," Economic Development and Cultural
Change, January 1956.
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on the contrary, such rule as there was was highly centralized and the
American or Spanish culture was quickly spread. Closely related to these
differences is the third major political factor, vizo that the Philippines
gained their freedom by evolution and Indonesia by revolution.
On the economic side an important difference is that while exports
of both countries are highly concentrated on a few products, in Indonesia
two mineral products--petroleum and tin--rank second and third after
rubber, followed by coconut products and tobacco; while in the
Philippines, all major e xports are plantation products--coconut products,
sugar, forest products, fruit and tobacco. Second, the Philippines faces
a substantially higher rate of population growth. The estimated annual
growth is li per cent to 2 per cent for Indonesia and 2.1 per cent to
3 per cent for the Philippines. Capital requirements for a glven rate
of increase in per ca incomes therefore tend to be higher in the
Philippines than in Indonesia. Third, the Philippines has nothing quite
like Java, with its incredibly fertile volcanic soil and assured rainfall,
which permit two or three crops a year and the sustenance of two-thirds
of Indonesia's population on this one small island, making it the most
densely populated sizeable area in the world.
Turning to differences which might be regarded as "effects," and
which are important for development olanning, perhaps most important is
the much more adequate supply of indigenous entrepreneurship in the
Philippines. Not only does the Philippines have a sizeable group of
able and ambitious entrepreneurs, but they have essentially American
attitudes towards technical change. They also have a 19th century
American attitude toward free private enterprise and toward the position
of the industrialist, financier, and trader in society. There is within
the Philippines elite none of the reluctance that some Indonesian leaders
still have "to sully their hands in trade." The relative prestige of
private entrepreneurs and of government officials is just the reverse
of what it is in Indonesia. A by-product of this attitude is that in
sharp contrast to Indonesia, where the bulk of investment is still in
foreign hands, in the Philippines over half the stock of capital is owned
by Filipinos. In the government service too the Philippines is much
better provided with well-trained people.
The relatively liberal policy of the United States in the Philippines,
the encouragement of domestic enterprise, and the evolutionary achievement
of independence has yielded other results as well. Where Indonesia
is neutralist, the Philippines is one of three Asian members of SEATO,
There is much less concern in the Philippines, too, over the use of
foreign aid and foreign investment from the West in the achievement of
development aims. I have sometimes tried to characterize the basic
Indonesian conflict as a struggle between a "history-minded" group,
mindful of Indonesia's recent past and fearful of Western influence in
any form, and an "economics-minded" group, attaching top priority to
economic development and willing to accept Western guidance and assistance
in achieving development somewhat along Western lines. 1 No such conflict
exists in the Philippines; even the Filipino leaders who are keenly
aware of their history have little resentment against American behavior
1B. Higgins, Economic Stabilization and Dgvelopment in Indonesia,
New York (IPR) 1957; and"Indonesia's Development Plans and Problems,"
Pacific Affairs, June 1956.
6toward them in the past; current anti-Americanism arises rather out of
the behavior of the United States at the present time; but even the
anti-Americanism does not take the form of resisting development along
Western lines or with Western assistance.
One offsetting feature of the heritage from Spanish and American
colonialism, unfortunately, is the attitude towards corruption in the
Philippines (presumably learned from the Spanish rather than the
Americans?). Corruption among government officials exists in both countries,
but the quality is different. In Indonesia, large-scale corruption in
high places began only within the past three ye ars, and was in the first
instance a by-product of party politics. Moreover, the basic Indonesian
attitude is that political corruption is sinful and should be punished.
Quite different is the Filipino attitude toward "anomalies," the well-
known synonym for corruption in that country. Corruption in high places
is more often for purely personal than for political purposes, and the
ordinary Filipino seems to take it for granted that people in positions of
power will use the power to line their own pockets. One feels that in
the Philippines the sin is not in diverting public funds to your own
bank account but in getting caught. Perhaps more important, Indonesian-
style corruption is less likely than Philippines-style to direct public
policy away from general ends towards personal goals.
Turning to more purely economic factors, a difference which might
be regarded as an "effect" of historical differences, is that per capita
income in the Philippines is nearly double that of Indonesia, and is
growing at a rate of at least 3 per cent per year. In Indonesia, it is
doubtful whether per capita income is growing at all, and it is certainly
7not rising more than 1 per cent or 1 1/2 per cent annually. The Philippines
are also more advanced in terms of the structure of production (40 per cent
in agriculture vs. 55 per cent) and of literacy. 1
These differences are reflected in the plans. Indonesia plans to invest
only 6 per cent of national income for development, the Philippines 10 per
cent. In Indonesia total government expenditure is expected to exceed 15
per cent of national income, in the Philippines it is to be limited to 11 or
12 per cent. More than half of total Indonesian investment is to be govern.
mental, in the Philippines only 40 per cent of the total is public investment.
However, it should be noted that the increase in the role of public invest-
ment implied by the plan is greater in the Philippines than it is in Indonesia.
Indonesian public investment is largely for government enterprises, while in
the Philippines government investment is mainly in "impulse" sectors with
the express purpose of providing the basis for increased private investment.
Similarly, the Philippines plan devotes much more attention to stipulation
of policies to encourage and direct private investment--an aspect of planning
almost totally ignored in the Indonesian plan. Finally, the Indonesian
plan is essentially a combination of project and target planning, with little
economic analysis. The Philippines development program has a highly
sophisticated plan framemork with a statistical-economic--almost econometric--
lIt will be noted from Table I that while a larger share of output comes
from the agricultural sector in Indonesia, a larger share of employment is
in agriculture in the Philippines. While the figures for both countries have
a considerable margin of error, and the actual differences between the two
countries may be less than these statistics suggest, the general picture
suggested by them is what might be expected. Plantation agriculture in
Indonesia is highly productive in terms of value produced per man-year, while
productivity in industry and mining is higher in the Philippines. A more
meaningful comparison might be peasant agriculture and cottage industry on the
one hand and plantations, mines, and manufactures on the other; but figures are
not available in this form. Superficial evidence suggests that productivity in
peasant agriculture is about the same in both countries.
8approach. The Philippines plan also provides for annual revision,
Obstacles: Indonesia
Since Indonesia is still essentially stagnant, the basic economic problem
there is to generate a "take-off" into sustained economic growth. Capital,
entrepreneurship, skills and foreign exchange are all bottlenecks, as in most
underdeveloped countries.
In addition, however, Indonesia has a peculiar problem arising out of
the regional structure of the economy, technological dualism, and of the
product-mix. For the Javanese rural economy simply can not absorb Javanese
population growth much longer without falling standards of living. Some in-
crease in yields per hectare can still be obtained by seed selection, im-
proved tillage, and cautious use of fertilizer, but such devices will give a
breathing spell of only a decade or two at most, Continuing increases in
productivity in Javanese agriculture can be obtained only through a shift to
more extensive and more mechanized agriculture.Solution of the Javanese pro-
blem requires that somewhat more than the additional 300,000 families each
year be absorbed elsewhere in the economy-into industries in Java or the
Outer Islands, or into agriculture in the Outer Islands, All this is expen~
sive, Providing, say, 400,000 jobs a year in any of these ways would cost at
least Rp. 4 billion per year.
Total capital requirements for a "take-off" have been estimated by the
M.I.T. Indbnesia Project at Rp. 12 to 15 billion per year. The obvious line3
of development are the creation of middle-sized import replacing industries
on Java (where the market is) and carrying further the processing of exporo
products of the Outer Islands (aluminum, tin smelting, pulp and paper,
petroleum refining, etc.).
9The Five Year Plan does not provide for investment on the scale or of
the type required. The Plan proper covers only the central government's deve.
lopment projects of Rp. 12.5 billion for five years--little more than half of
what is needed to solve the Javanese problem alone. The program includes
Rp. 7.5 billion for community development and Rp. 10 billion for private in.
vestment, but no detailed projects have been presented in either of these
categories, and in the case of private investment no suggestions are made for
policies to encourage and direct this volume of investment.
The estimates of capital requirements for launching cumulative growth in
Indonesia undertaken by the M.I.T. Indonesia Project suggest that the invest-
ment budget in Indonesia's first Five Year .Plan is much too small. 1 This con-
clusion is in effect corroborated by the National Planning Bureau, which looks
forward to the achievement of sustained growth only in the course of the
fourth Five Year Plan. The Plan speaks of the sacrifice of the current genera-
tion for Indonesia's future. In fact, however, the Indonesian development plan
involves neither a sacrificial effort for one generation nor an early take-off
into steady growth. Only 40 per cent of the expected small increase in Rer
capita income (1.3 per cent) is to be recaptured for future investment, and
60 per cent is to be made available for higher consumption. Thus no "belt-
tightening" is called for; on the other hand, an increase in per capit con-
sumption of three-quarters of 1 per cent per year, starting from the present
low level, will not in itself generate enthusiasm for the plan.
One might argue that in a society that has been stagnant for generations
(if not actually declining)it does not matter much whether cumulative growth
starts now or in twenty years. However, the achievement of steady growth in
twenty years depends on the increase of investment from 6.8 per cent of national
income in the first Five Year Plan to 8, per cent in the second Five Year Plan,
12 per cent in the third five years, 16 per cent in the next, and 20 per cent by
the end of the 4th Five Year Plano Increases in investment are so small that with the
1f. Eugene Grasberg, and Douglas Paauw.
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imperfections of national income statistics it would be very hard to tell
whether year-by-year goals are being attained or not; yet even these
modest goals require a more rigorous fiscal policy--and thus some
enthusiasm for the Plan. A stagnant economy is like a stalled car;
leaning on it with gradually increasing weight is unlikely to get it
started. It needs "a big push." The Indonesian approach will not
change parameters enough to bring new attitudesnew behavior patterns
and the like. This hesitancy in launching an effective development
program is particularly unfortunate since the revolution itself injected
a dynamic into Indonesian society that might well have been directed
toward economic growth. If too much time is allowed to pass without a
major developmental effort this dynamic may be lost,
Moreover, the political situation is clearly unstable. To satisfy
the demands of dissident groups, and particularly of the Outer Islands,
the government must either engender a united effort "to win the economic
revolution," or provide noticeable improvements in the standard of
living in the near future. In point of fact, considering the optimism
with respect to ICOR it is doubtful whether the Plan will do more than
keep pace with population growth.
Thirdly, the present Plan will not solve the employment problem.
It leaves essentially untouched the growing discrepancies between
per capita output in Java and on the Outer Islands, which can only
aggrevate frictions between the center and the outlying regions. It
might be added that neighboring countries are doing better than Indonesia
relative to their incomes. It is a question as to how long Indonesians
will remain content with a development plan that brings such meager results.
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If the modesty of the Plan represents a political judgement of what
is possible at this stage, it would be brash indeed for any outsider to
criticize it on these grounds. If it is based on the experience of such
countries as India (the scale of the investment plan and the ICOR are
the same as in the first Indian Five Year Plan), however, it represents
a misapplication of this experience. Indonesia starts from a much higher
per income and a much broader resource base than India, and can
accordingly start with a larger program than was entailed in the first
Indian Five Year Plan.
It is the author's belief that the main reason for the small-scale
planning is that in Indonesia a "big push" would require decisions
regarding the form of the economy and the society, relations of Indonesia
to the West, and the like. Thus far Indonesian leaders have not been prepared
to make decisions of this kind,
Back of the long delay in completion of the development plan and
the limited scope of the plan as completed is the fundamental problem
which confronts all aspects of Indonesian economic policy: the lack of
resolution of the basic political conflict concerning the relationship
of Indonesia to the outside world. Indonesia has not decided whether or
to what extent it wishes to rely on foreign experts, foreign aid, and
foreign investment in achieving its development objectives Without
such a decision, even the dimensions of the development programme are
hard to determine, Determining its composition is even more difficult.
Priorities cannot be established independently of the scale of develop-
mental activity, and w projects can be financed depends a good deal on
where finance is sought.
12
Only four parties--Nationalist, Masjumi (Moslem), Nahdatul Ulama
(Moslem) and Communist--emerged from the elections with significant
popular support. Even for the four major parties, however, it is not
easy to characterize attitudes towards economic policy in general or
toward economic development in particular. In any case, the major issues
run across party lines. Each major party is split within itself on
basic issues. While there are innumerable shadings of opinion, for
analytical purposes it is convenient to divide the politically active
and articulate Indonesians into two groups. One of these is a group
led by relatively young, sometimes foreign-trained intellectuals who
attach high priority to economic and social development of the country,
who feel that this development must follow Western lines in large measure,
and who are willing to co-operate with the West, at least to the extent
of seeking technical and capital assistance from the West, in order to
achieve this goal, This group might be labelled "economic-minded."
The other group is a mixture of Communists and of a larger number
who are nationalist, conservative (in Western terms), and isolationist.
Its leaders attach highest priority to "completion of the revolution" in
the sense of eliminating the control on Indonesian natio ial life exerted
by foreigners through economic activity. While favouring economic and
social development they attach great importance to retention of the national
culture, language and religion and to abolishing the remnants of foreign
influence. The attitudes of this group spring in large measure from the
country's long history of resistance to foreign invaders, culminating in
the postwar revolution. They might be labelled for convenience "history-
minded."
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While the "economic-minded" group tends to give priority to economic
development, the "history-minded" group gi:ves higher priority to "converting
the colonial economy into a national economy." In short, one might say
that the first group is more concerned with "making the pie grow" and the
second with dividing it more evenly, especially as between nationals and
foreigners.
Events during the first half of 1957 focussed attention on another
important cross-party split: the "Outer Islands" against the Center.
This split reflects a more severe form of the "states rights" cry familiar
in the United States. Indonesia has rejected federation--at least for the
time being--because Indonesians feel that the "United States of Indonesia"
was a Dutch device for preventing their unification into a strong nation.
Meanwhile, centralization of powers has been exdessive, and has caused open
resentment in the outlying districts.
Converting the colonial economy into a national economy
Despite differences in emphasis, all political parties in Indonesia
are agreed on "converting the colonial economy into a national economy."
A "national" economy does not mean "natio ialized," but "Indonesianized."
Most parties are not greatly concerned about "public vs. private enterprise."
All of them, however, are concerned with increasing the share of Indonesians
in the ownership and management of major enterprises. The necessary
amounts of foreign capital-whether from private enterprise, from
governments, from foundations, or from international agencies-must be
obtained in a manner which is consistent with the "conversion of the
colonial economy into a national economiy" in this sense0
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Social Goals and Problems
The political ambivalence with regard to development has roots deep
in Indonesian society. As pointed out in an earlier article, even
becoming "business-minded" has a negative valence to the Indonesian.
One of the most often expressed ideals today in Indonesia is that of
helping each other and working together. "Ramah-tamah," the quality
of being familiar (family-like) and friendly, is perhaps the most-admired
attribute.
Some Indonesian leaders fear the loss of this "family-like" atmosphere
and its replacement with a "cold, materialistic, efficiency-centered,
rationalistic, 'Western' spirit." They want to keep the "spirit of the
revolution," the "Indonesian spirit" and "our way." Part of their concern
is tied up with the fear of too rapid a change, or the inability of the
people to shift modes of thought and behavior so quickly. Part also is
a genuine desire to hold on to the graciousness and charm of the
traditional modes.
The political expression of this conflict of social goals is the
Drircipal barrier to their achievement in Indonesia today. The leaders
seek more "business-mindedness" on the part of their people, but are
opposed by their own desired to hold on to the gotong-rojong and
mutual-aid, familistic concepts. They would like a blend of the trad-
ditional village life, and the modern world of trade and commerce and
advanced technology. Meanwhile, the wish to increase efficiency in
government and business conflicts with the desire to retain the more
positive aspects of paternalism, and development of local culture impedes
the development of a unified national culture.
Until there is a clear determination by the Indonesian people-
or at least by their leaders--as to the kind of society they want to
build, it is difficult for them to assess the relative merits of
various development schemes that may be suggested. It is not only
that no clean political decision as to the proper role of foreign
enterprise has yet been made; it is also that the Indonesians are
ambivalent about the role in their society of large-scale enterprise,
of modern enterprise, of competitive enterprise, of individual
enterprise. This lack of determination of aims with regard to social
and economic organization makes it difficult at this stage of organize
a "big push" towards sustained growth.
Obstacles: The Philippines
A casual glance at postwar figures of national income and output
in the Philippines might lead one to conclude that economic develop-
ment is no problem in that country. During the past six years
national income has been rising by something more than 5 per cent
per year, while the price level shows a gently falling trend. Here is
a record of "steady growth" that has few rivals in economic history;
at first blush one might feel that the record of the Philippines is
one that other countries might well envy. However, behind this
attractive facade are economic and social disorders that threaten not
only economic stability but social and political stability as well.
There are four major economic problems in the Philippines. First,
maintaining past rates of growth will become increasingly difficult
as time goes by; signs of retardation of growth have already appeared.
Second, the rise in national income has thus far done little to relieve
the extreme poverty of the vast majority of Filipinos. Third, the
balance of payments continues in fundamental disequilibrium. Fourth,
unemployment is high and apparently growing despite the rise in
national income,
The Problem of Maintaining Growth
The Philippines has shared with other war torn countries the
experience of obtaining very high rates of return on capital (very
low "ICORs" in economist's jargon) during the reconstruction
period. In the Philippines a large proportion of investment between
1946 and 1952 represented reclamation and replanting of agricultural
land, a process bringing substantial increases in output with little
or no outlay on capital equipment. Fertiliser provided through the
foreign aid program brought quick increases in agricultural produc-
tivity. The repair of damaged machines, buildings, transport equip-
ment and the like permitted the restoration of whole complexes of
productive apparatus for very little cost. Large amounts of war
surplus equipment were obtained at prices far below cost. All these
conditions facilitated significant additions to output for relatively
little capital outlay.
Such opportunities, however, will not arise again in the near
future. On the contrary, when the time comes to replace this inexpen-
sive capital, costs are likely to be much higher than they originally
were. True, in a plantation economy the expansion of output
(particularly of coconut products) can continue for some years after
investments were made. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that over
16
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the next five years capital:output ratios will be higher than they
were during the reconstruction period. The figures of output in-
dicate that the rate of economic growth has already tapered off to
some degree, with a transition from "reconstruction" to "normal
growth" somewhere around 1952.
The impression one gets of trends in the Philippines economr is
very different if, instead of looking at only postwar figures of
output and income, one converts production figures to per capita
terms and compares present levels with prewar. The picture then
obtained in the agricultural sector is one of restoration and sub-
sequent maintenance of traditional relationships between the number
of hectares under cultivetion and total population, with little change
in output per hectare. For plantation output, both hectarage under
cultivation and output is lower in per capita terms than it was before
the war. The picture for minerals is mixed, but in any case these
still play a small role in exports and income.
Povert
In 1950 the United States Economic Survey Mission (Bell Mission)
noted the large and increasing inequalities in income in the
Philippines. There is little evidence that income distribution has since
improved. Between 1946 and 1954 entrepreneurial and company incomes
rose somewhat more than wage and salary incomes. In the latter year,
the proportion of national income going to entrepreneurs and property
owners was much higher than in economically advanced countries--56 per-
cent of national income as compared to 44 per cent for wages and
18
salaries. Wages of skilled industrial workers in Manila actually fell
somewhat between 1950 and 1955, while wages of unskillled industrial
workers in Manila showed only slight improvement. The increase in
daily wages of agricultural workers was not sufficient to raise rural
wage rates much above prewar or to bring significant changes in their
severely curtailed way of life.
The fiscal process does little to mobilise potential savings nor
to redress the aldistribution of income. The Filipinos blithely
refer to themselves as "the world's worst taxpayers", and the label
seems to stick. Total tax revenues in recent years have run at only
8 per cent or 9 per cent of national income, as compared to 10 per
cent in Indonesia (with per capita income half as high), 25 per cent
in Burma, 16 per cent in Japan, 21 per cent in Ceylon, 22 per cent in
the United States and Canada, etc. Tax evasion is widespread among the
upper middle and upper income groups. Corporation and personal income
taxes together accounted for less than 20 per cent of central government
tax revenues in 1955, and only a small fraction of these was paid by
Filipinos in the higher income brackets0 More than half of the total
revenues from income tax is represented by taxes on corporations, a
substantial share of which is paid by foreign concerns. Of personal
income taxes actually paid, less than half is paid by Filipinos, and
these represent mainly deductions from wages in the form of a with-
holding tax, The tax structure as a whole is highly regressive; the
great bulk of revenues come from commodity taxes of one kind or another
which are shifted to the final consummer.
Underlying the unequal distribution of income is the concentration
of land ownership, a social problem which has caused much concern among
19
the American advisers to the Philippines Government. Legislation
of 1954 has improved the tenant's share of agricultural income, but
the land reform law of 199 does not seem to have had much effect on
the distribution of land ownership.
By and large, it seems safe to say that the standard of living
of the masses of the Philippines people has improved but little over
prewar levels, despite the continuous rise in national income. Postwar
increases in income, even more than wealth, have been concentrated
in the hands of the upper income groups.
Balance of Payments
The Philippines has had a chronic import surplus ever since the
war, and only large scale foreign aid, American expenditures on
military bases and veteraan's pensions, and the like have prevented
more serious losses of foreign exchange than have actuelly taken
place. Even with these extraordinary sources of foreign exchange, it
has been necessary to make exchange controls increasingly rigorous to
prevent foreign exchange reserves from falling to dangerously low
levels.
The favorable balance of Philippines commodity trade before the
war depended upon a narrow range of traditional exports, most of which
were products of plantation agriculture: copra and other coconut
products, sugar, forest products, fruit and tobacco. These commodities
still provide the bulk of Philippines exports. Coconut products alone
still account for about 40 per cent of the value of exports and the
first four groups for over 80 per cent,
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These plantation industries now face serious problems. As in
Indonesia, the total area under plantation crops is tbill below the
prewar level. The problem confronting the plantation industries of
the Philippines are largely the same as in Indonesia: loss of productive
land through destruction, squatters, blight, disease and inadequate
maintenance, combined with increasing competition from synthetics and
other rival products. However, whereas market prospects for natural
rubber are reasonably bright for some years to come and the market for
petroleum products is rapidly expanding, the outlook for the major
exports of the Philippines is much more dim. The principle use of
coconut products is the manufacture of soaps. In the American market,
which absorbs hO per cent to 50 per cent of Philippines exports of
coconut products, soap is being increasing displaced by detergents.
Sugar remains the second most important Philippines export, but here
the major factor is the American quota of 952,000 short tons. The
present agreement with the United States Government ends in 1974; if
then the arrangements are not renewed, the prospects for Philippines
sugar exports would be dim indeed. Among all major Philippines exports,
abaca (Manila hemp) has suffered the most severe setback from prewar
days. The United States Department of Commerce Survey of the Philippines
says, "So serious are the problems of the Philippines abaca industry
that there is some question of its ability to survive." Meanwhile, no
new exports have appeared on the horizon which seem capable of replacing
the traditional ones in the short run.
12ploymnt
The National Economic Council estimates the current (1956) level
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of unemployment, including persons employed less than half time,
at 1.9 million people, or 19 per cent of the labor force. When disguised
unemployment is included, the figure could of course be much higher.
As yet no reliable estimates of the trend in unemployment are available.
The only published figure is in the Central Bank Annual Report for
1954-1955, which, in conjunction with the National Economic Councll's
new estimate of increase in the labor force of 275,000 per year, would
give an increase in unemployment of more than 100,000 persons per
year. However, it seems likely that the Bank's figure underestimates
increases in rural employment; a better assumption might be that open
unemployment is growing at 50,000 to 70,000 per year and disguised
unemployment by 70,000 to 80,000 per year,
The increase in unemployment is made more serious from the social
and political point of view by the tendency for disguised unemployment
to move into the cities and become open. The postwar growth of Manila
in particular has failed to produce a proportionate increase in a number
of productive full-time jobs.
A particularly serious aspect of the whole employment picture is
growing unemployment of educated people. With nearly 200,000 students
in Philippines universities and some 600,000 students in high schools, it
would appear that graduate of these institutions are being turned out
faster than jobs are being created for them in technical, professional,
end administrative positions, Indeed the total number of high school
and college graduates each year exceeds the estimated total increase
in employment. Moreover, the curricula of Philippines universities
are not adapted to a developing econouer. Law and humanities still
account for a large proportion of university degrees, and relatively
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few Filipinos receive vocational or technical training. Obviously
university graduates and even high school graduate will be less
content than uneducated children to return to the barrios if they do not
find employment in the cities.
Conclusion
The task of economic development planners in the Philippines
has four major aspects, conforming to the major problems to be solved:
(1) Past rates of economic growth must be maintained in the
face of increasing difficulties. This will require substantial in-
creases in net investment. While the general situation was mildly
deflationary until recent months, the required increase in develop-
mental investment could not be undertaken without inflation, unless
it is financed by increased voluntary savings or taxes.
(2) A larger share of investment must be directed towards providing
for the needs of the lower income groups, and the tax system and its
administration must be reformed so as to permit the lower income
groups to share more heavily in the increases in national income.
(3) The structure of production, and particularly the structure
of exports, must be changed so as to provide new sources of foreign
exchange. At the same time, import-replacing industries must be deve-
loped. In general, a much more rapid growth of the relative share of
manufacturing in national income must be encouraged.
(h) Means must be found of increasing the rate of job creation.
In part this can be done by increasing the total level of development
investment, and in part by giving higher priorities in the development
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program to enterprises (public and private) with relatively low capital:
job ratios.
Development Planning in the Philippines
The preparation of development plans in the Philippines is the
responsibility of the National Economic Council. Under Reorganisation
Plan #10, the National Economic Council is also assigned the function
of advising the government on all aspects of monetary, fiscal, foreign
exchange, tariff, reparations, and other policies relating to economic
development.
The composition of the National Economic Council is a somewhat
curious one. There are two Senators and two members of the House of
Representatives; these positions are necessarily political in large
degree. The Governor of the Central Bank and the Chairman of the
Board of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation are ex officio members,
There is then one representative each for industry, agriculture, and
labor. Thus the National Economic Council combines features of the
Council of Economic Advisers and the Joint Committee on the President's
Economic Report, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and the Russian Supreme Economic Council.
The National Economic Council has a sizeable secretariat, divided
into three offices: Statistical Coordination and Standards, Foreign
Aid Coordination, and National Planning. It is the last of these which
is concerned with the actual work of putting together a development plan.
The Office of National Planning in turn is divided into six branches:
agricultural resources, services (utilities), social development, trade
and commerce, industrial resources, and finance.
In comparison to the planning staffs in most underdeveloped coun-
tries, the Office of National Planning is in an enviable position with
respect both to numbers and to quality of its personnel. Each branch
has a chief with special training and some years of experience in his
field, supported by varying numbers of qualified technicians. Moreover,
the National Economic Council is able to draw on the expertise of the
Central Bank, the Budget Commission, the Industrial Research Center,
and other government agencies, although it has not always made the
most of these opportunities.
The relatively large number of trained people, plus an unexplained
Filipino passion for statistics, may explain the highly sophisticated
methodology in the Office of National Planning. All the latest devices
of the development planner's craft are brought to bear in the preparation
of the Philippines Five-Year Development Program. The starting point
is a target increase in national income, which has been set at 6 per
cent, slightly above the average of recent years. The target national
income is then broken down by major sectors, using the actual structural
distribution in recent years as a starting point, and providing for
desired structural change within the economy during the planning period.
Estimates are then made of the incremental-capital-output-ratio in each
of these sectors. Thus the income 'targets, together with the sectoral
ICORe, provide the estimate of capital requirements,
The distribution of investment between the public and private
sectors starts from the traditional distribution of investment within
the country, but makes some attempt to undertake in the public sector
as much investment in "impulse sectors" as can be counted upon to bring
with them increases in private investment as well. A separate estimate
is made, using a rather refined multiplier formula, complete with merginal
propensities to consume and import and the like, of the amount of deficit
financed development spending that can be undertaken without creating
an undesirable degree of inflationary pressure. Finally, in allocating
foreign exchange, intermediate and long term credit, and tax privileges,
use is to be made of a priority formula, which is an adaptation to the
Philippines econoVy of the investment formula worked out by Hollis
Chenery of Stanford University. In effect, this formula attempts to
assign priorities according to the ratio between "benefits" in terms of
net contribution to national income (including external economies),
net contribution to employment, and net improvement of the balance of
payments, to cost in terms of capital and foreign exchange. In the
public sector, priorities are assigned mainly on the basis of advice
from government departments and corporations, within the general frame-
work worked out by the National Economic Council. It is possible,
however, that the National Economic Council will at some stage decide
to apply the priority formula in the public sector as well.
While this methodology is virtually beyond reproach, there are some
unsatisfactory features of its application to the actual problems of the
Philippines. These shortcomings reflect the political and social
environment within which plans must be made rather than any deficiencies
of technique among the professional planners.
The Economic and Social Development Program, 1957-1961
The Development Program starts, as it should, with an analysis
of the problems which the plan is designed to solve. It proceeds to a
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brief statement of the major objectives of the Plan. The public
investment program is presented in some detail, which is proper, since
this is the sector over which the government has direct control. There
are separate chapters on Social Development, Finance, and Public
Administration. The chapter on financing is brief, but this defect
is perhaps inevitable in view of the wish to withhold presentation of
the Fiscal and Foreign Exchenge Budgets until the private sector of
the plan has also been discussed. The chapter on administration has one
glaring omission; it takes no account of problems of business adinis-
.trationswhich may be as important as public administration in an economy
such as the Philippines. Perhaps later versions of the plan could
include some discussion of the training and recruitment of managers.
The chapter on financing private investment is in an appropriate
form, but is somewhat uneven from one section to another as to sub-
stance. The sections on tax policy, reparations, foreign aid and foreign
investment are wel worked out; those on encouraging and mobilizing
savings, on monetary and credit policy, on budgetary policy, and on
tariffs are conspicuously lacking in positive proposals. However, the
presentation in this chapter has the advantage of making it clear what
the weak sections are, so that the National Economic Council can direct
further research efforts to these areas in subsequent versions of the
Program.
The inclusion of a foreign exchange budget and a fiscal budget
for the whole five year period is a strong feature of the Program.
Another significant feature is a separate part on Recommendations for
Action by the Various Agencies of the Government.
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A major problem underlying the Program is the lack of adequate
data on past levels of national income and of investment. A discerning
reader will soon discover that what the plan really proposes is a mere
extension of the statjus gno. It is said at one point that the rate of
increase in national income has been in excess of five per cent since
the war, and in the last year or so has been about six per cent; yet
the target is merely a six per cent increase in national income.
Similarly, the report now cautiously states that net investment in
the recent past has been less than ten per cent of national income, but
the plan does not raise it above ten per cent of national income.
Caution with respect to statistics is admirable; but the Program would
be strengthened by a frank statement that the objective of economic
development in the Philippines is not to accelerate the rate of increase
in national income, but to sustain it in the face of increasing diffi-
culties as the period of reconstruction recedes into the past; to
distribute the fruits of economic growth more widely; and to translate
the increase in national income into decreasing unemployment.
It is by no means certain that the present plan will achieve these
objectives. Even with optimistic estimates of employment-creation, it
would take thirty years of investment at the planned level to eliminate
unemployment. With more modest estimates of employment-creation the
planned investment would not reduce unemployment at ll. Moreover,
while the estiwte of capital-cost-per-job is reasonable, it is by no
means pessimistic; indeed $2,000 per job would seem to be about the
minimum reasonable estimate fcr the kind of program which is proposed.
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The Program as published avoids reference to the underlying ICOR
estimates. It is perhaps better to state the plan in general terms
than to rely too much on ICORs of dubious validity. But there is always
an implicit ICOR in any development plan that gives both an investment
program and an income target, and this implicit ICOR is very much on the
low side, about 2/1. This figure is a highly optimistic one for a pro-o
gram with the complexion of the one proposed in the draft plan. The
Second Indian Five-Year Plan has an implicit ICOR of 2.2, and most of
its critics are agreed that even this figure is too low. Yet the
Philippines Plan is more heavily weighted with high-ICOR projects than
the Indian one. It is derived from a quite unwarranted procedure. This
problem requires further study.
All these shortcomings are of the kind which can be eliminated
in subsequent versions of the plan as the statistical basis is improved
and experience gained.
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Conclusions
Indonesia and the Philippines face common obstacles to economic de-
velopment. In both countries the achievement of sustained growth requires
drastic structural change, involving the development of industrial ex-
ports and import-replacing industries. To reach reasonably high standards
of living for the whole population, the structural change must be carried to
the point of reducing substantially the proportion of employment in agricul-
ture and shifting to more extensive and more mechanized techniques in the
peasant agriculture sector. This latter form of change is more pressingly
needed in Indonesia because of the limitations on further expansion of
agriculture sector. This latter form of change is more pressingly needed
in Indonesia because of the limitations on further expansion of agricultural
output on Java with present techniques, and the concentration of population
on that island. On the other hand the problem of unemployment would seem
to be more serious in the Philippines, and the social problems accompanying
unbalanced growth would seem to be more severe. Indeed the Philippines
problem is one of maintaining past rates of increase in income, while
achieving structural change, reducing unemployment, and spreading the bene-
fits of economic growth.
For the accomplishment of development goals, Indonesia seems more
blessed by nature and the Philippines more blessed by history. Indonesia
starts her planned development with a wide range of natural resources which
permit balanced growth without difficulty. But she also starts with a
severe lack of trained and experienced public administrators, entrepreneurs
and managers, and technicians; with the hampering influence of extreme na-
tionalism; and with the Imotty problem of population pressure on Java, which
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is closely related to the problem of political disunity that is now occupy-
ing most of the energies of national leaders. In Indonesia the main re-
quirement for economic development is the achievement of political unity
so that the government can get on with the jobo
On balance, it appears that the Philippines is in a stronger position
than Indonesia for early achievement of sustained economic growth. The
country is less plagued by problems of stabilization. Both the internal and
external values of the currency have been kept stable for several years, and
the mild inflationary pressure that has developed in the past year is not
cause for great concern. While there is pressure on the external value of the
peso, it is of a kind which is related to the long-run necessity of structu-
ral change rather than to short-run fluctuations in the foreign exchange
market. Thus the Philippine authorities need not devote as much time and
energy to stabilization as their counterparts in some other countries, inclu-
ding Indonesia. They are free to concentrate on problems of economic
development.
Second, because of the relatively high per capita income, internal fi-
nancing of the lion's share of investment requirements presents relatively
little difficulty. Foreign exchange must be found for the raw materials and
equipment needed for development, but further cuts in luxury imports could
provide most of that. The concentration of income and wealth presents social
problems, but it can be converted into a source of strength from the stand-
point of economic development. It means that high ratios of savings and in-
vestment to national income can be achieved without reductions in the stand-
ard of living of the masses of the people. In the Philippines, diverting
12 per cent to 15 per cent of national income to public and private investment
or
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purposes, which is necessary to launch a process of sustained economic
growth, can be accomplished without imposing hardship on any group, even in
the short-run.
Third, the higher standards of literacy and education while they produce
social problems when unaccompanied by an appropriate development program,
can become a major asset if such a program is formulated and executed. A
high level of literacy is the basis for quick and widespread results in agri-
cultural extension work, manpower training programs, and other measures de-
signed to raise manhour productivity. The importance attached to higher edu-
cation, with some redesigning of university curricula, makes it easier to
provide the flow of managers and technicians needed for relatively rapid in-
dustrialization. Moreover, perhaps because of the decades of association
with the United States, Filipinos are a good deal more "technology minded"
than many of their neighbours; there is less resistance to technical change
and more interest in new techniques than in many underdeveloped countries.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the Philippines does not as yet
suffer from population pressure. The rate of population growth is high, but
the base on which it takes place is still small relative to resources.
Accordingly, the Philippines has been granted a "breathing spell" which many
underdeveloped countries do not have, during which higher levels of produc-
tivity can be achieved so as to permit a rise in national income significantly
higher than population growth.
Together, these factors provide a basis for rapid economic development
in the Philippines that few underdeveloped countries enjoy. It is a matter
of seizing the opportunity before it is too late.
TABLE I. The Indonesian and Philippines Economies
(1995 Figures Unless Otherwise Stated)
Indonesia
83 millionPopulation
576,000 sq. miles
144 per sq. mileAV density
Philippines
22 million
116,00 sq. miles
190 per sq. mile
Max. density
National incomel
1050 (Java)
$9,000 million
(Luson)
$3,900 million
Per capita incore
Agric, income in %
of total
Agric. employment in
% of total
Major exports
Major imports
rubber, petroleum, tin
coconut products teatobacco
sugarpilesi, rice, pa
an dyes, fertilizer, paper,
iron and steel
coconut products, sugar, abaca
logs and lumber iron ore, chro-
mite e, minera u e a
mac inery, base retals, trans-
port equipment
Exports in % of GNP
Net investment in % net
national income
Public investment in % total
Current Government Export
% GNP
1 Converted at official rates
$100 $180
60
40
70
10
5
13
10
10.3
25
7.3
J
eTABLE II. Structure of Indonesian, Philippines,
and Indian vel opment Plans
Indonei P. I. India (Plan I
Tote). net investment in %
c National Income 6 10.6 9
Putblic net investment
in % of total 55 40 60
Private not investment
in % of total 45 60 Io
Current Expendlitures of
Central Government in % GNP 12 7.3
Structura of Public Investment (%)
Ag iculture 13 8.5 11.81
Irigation 11 8.0 7,9
Irxutry and Mining 25 23.0 18.5
Transport 25 25.0 28.9
Public Fr)rks ( and other) -- 12,0 43
Public Utilities (pouer) 14 .16.0 8.9
Social Development 12 7.5 19,7
100 100.0 100.0
Source: Five Year Plans.
1 Includes community development
